___________________________________________________________________________
The book studies "Generalized Information Theory" (GIT), being generalizations of, basically, two theories: possibility based uncertainty theory and probability based uncertainty theory. In the whole book, information has to be considered as the reduction of uncertainty, the latter to be defined.
Classical possibility based uncertainty theory is the simplest and the oldest of the two theories. It measures how possible an event is (given a universe X and a subset EX 
where A is the complement of A in X (for the time being, all sets are ordinary sets, also called crisp sets as contrasted with so-called fuzzy sets -see later). Possibility based uncertainty theory was developed by Hartley (1928) where the amount of uncertainty associated with the (finite) set E is (essentially):
where E denotes the cardinality of E. 
It is well-known that (5), together with continuity of H, implies (4) (up to a constant), cf. Roberts (1979) , based on elementary observations of functions satisfying functional relations of the type (5) -see also Egghe (2005) , Appendix I. It is surprising that in the present book this classical argument is not used nor referenced and that a more intricate argument (of Rényi) is presented, hereby not referring to Roberts (1979) .
Less elementary is the theory of probability based uncertainty. 
a property called additivity.
Probability based uncertainty theory has been developed in 1948 by Shannon (cf. Shannon (1948) ): in this case the amount of uncertainty is measured as follows: 
which is essentially the same as (4) which is not surprising since, essentially, probability aspects have been eliminated. The notion of entropy is the most important notion of information theory. It measures the (average) amount of information one has (i.e. reduction of uncertainty) when events appear, given the probability distribution p. There are numerous applications of this measure ranging from coding theory to automatic indexation to information retrieval and linguistics. Most importantly, formulae (10) and (12) (the building blocks of (10)) form the basis for the notion of "bits", i.e. the number of 0s and 1s to binary represent the elements in a set of cardinality n (fixed or non-fixed length coding) -see e.g. the classical Heaps (1978) . Also the measure entropy is unique (up to a constant) based on the requirements that it is continuous and that the amount of information in two independent events is the sum of the amounts of information in the separate events (comparable with requirement (5)).
After an Introductory Chapter 1, classical possibility based uncertainty theory is discussed in Chapter 2 and classical probability based uncertainty theory is discussed in Chapter 3.
The rest of the book is devoted to extensions of these theories. One can distinguish two different ways of doing this: first by generalizing the notion of probability measure to monotone measures  that are non-additive. Here monotone measures are measures
which generalizes the additivity property. This occupies the attention in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
A second way of extending these theories is by replacing ordinary sets by fuzzy sets (Chapters 7 and 8).
In Chapter 4 one studies monotone non-additive measures such as Choquet capacities, i.e.
monotone measures  that satisfy
for all families of k subsets of the universe X ( here Assume that we know the marginal probabilities ( ) ( 
So we have a whole set of possible probability distributions, called a credal set D. Going back to the general notation X for the universe we can, for every AX Ì , define a lower probability 
replacing the probability distribution on X (m now acts on ( ) X P , the set of all subsets of X). The author, however, recognizes that none of the above extensions of entropy are mathematically satisfactory since the subadditivity property of entropy is violated. The present reviewer is unable to comment further on the (lack of) quality of these measures.
This reviewer, however, has the impression that, certainly from Chapter 7 on, the book Although Chapter 8 gives fuzzy set interpretations of possibility theory and of probability theory one does not (apparently) present general fuzzified Hartley or Shannon measures. The fact that these theories are underdeveloped is also recognized in the conclusions Chapter 10.
The "methodological" Chapter 9 is a mixture of philosophical and mathematical principles underlying uncertainty. The first two principles discuss the principle of "minimum" and "maximum" uncertainty. The latter one is mathematically formulated while the former one is not. Let us start with the latter one. As recognized in the book under review this principle is better known as the "maximum entropy principle" (MEP) as it is also studied in Egghe and Lafouge (2006) . ( Egghe and Lafouge (2006) , by giving an extra proof we show that condition (29) (i.e. with 0  > ) is necessary and sufficient. This implies that a "principle of minimum uncertainty" (i.e. a "minimum entropy principle") is nonexisting since this would imply the same necessary conditions ! We recognize that, in the book under review, the latter principle has not been formulated in a mathematically exact way but making two sections (9.2 and 9.3) on these principles at least presupposes that they both exist in a mathematically similar formulation, which is not the case ! What is lacking here is the "old" principle of least effort (PLE), well-known in linguistics (admittingly, less known in mathematics -see Egghe and Lafouge (2006) ) and attributed to Zipf (1949) (but see also Rousseau (2002) ) which states that (27) should be minimal, now subject to a constant value of (26) and (28). In Egghe and Lafouge (2006) it is shown that this principle is equivalent with (29) but for 1  ³ . This required for a principle that is equivalent with (29) for 01  <<. It was found in Egghe and Lafouge (2006) that the principle of most effort (PME) (introduced there) is the "missing link": here we require (27) to be maximal subject to a constant value of (26) and (28). This principle is shown to be equivalent to (29) for 01  <£ (and where (PLE) and (PME) coincide for 1  = , a degenerate case).
The last two principles in Chapter 9 are also "very philosophical" and deal with the way we can go from one uncertainty theory to another. These principles do not belong to a mathematical theory and, as recognized in the book under review, are underdeveloped. We think we can leave it here in view of the pitfalls of the former (philosophical) "principle" of minimum uncertainty which is, mathematically, non-existing and because of the underdeveloped state of many uncertainty theories (as recognized in this book).
A general conclusion is that this book has the merit to discuss some acceptable extensions of uncertainty theories e.g. to cases of non-additive probability measures and to cases of fuzzy sets but that the book suffers from a non-appropriate mixture of mathematical principles and philosophical principles (often as a substitute for not (yet) understood or even non-existing mathematical principles).
The book has a relatively fair price but it should only be recommended to researchers in this narrow field and certainly not to general researchers in information science (including informetrics researchers) as is the case for the JASIST readership.
